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THE DILEMMA OF PIRATICAL RANSOMS: SHOULD THEY BE PAID
OR NOT? ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF KIDNAPPED SEAMEN AND
THEIR FAMILIES
Barry Hart Dubner

* & Kimberly Chavers **

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, Professor Dubner has written many articles and even wrote the
first book on sea piracy in 1977. 1 He has always looked at the problem from the
perspective of the human rights of pirates (e.g., fair treatment, their ages, evidence
presented against them, etc.). He has also looked at the topic from a different
viewpoint; specifically, he was concerned about ·how piracy affected the
environment as well as the innocent people being killed, such as the Vietnamese
refugees who were being robbed, raped, and murdered by Thai pirates (e.g.,
fisherman off the coast of Thailand). He never considered the rights of seamen who
are being held hostage and who are living under such severe conditions.
Professor Dubner's first introduction to the topic of ransoms came when he
was invited to participate and speak at a meeting held at the Harvard University
Kennedy School in December 2009. The meeting lasted about two-and-a-half days,
and the twenty-two participants were invited from all over the world to help decide
what to do about piracy off the coast of Somalia and elsewhere. One topic that was
discussed was ransom payments. In the final analysis of the meeting, one of their
conclusions concerned the payment of ·ransom by "ocean carriers, insurance
companies, individuals, and states."2 The group decided that the various persons
involved, such as "ocean carriers, insurance companies, individuals, and states
[should] cease paying ransoms." 3 The thinking was, "[i]f every major shipping firm
is on record forbidding the paying of ransoms, and/or if the leading maritime
nations agree to deter their own firms from responding to ransom requests, the
profits of piracy will ebb."4 "Admittedly, enforcing such a controversial and

*
Barry Hart Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law, Orlando,
Florida; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law; LL.M., New York University
School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of Law. Professor Dubner would like to thank and
acknowledge his research assistant, Sarah Fredrickson, for her diligent and dedicated research.
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Kimberly Chavers, B.A., University of South Florida; J.D. Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas
School of Law, Orlando, Florida.
I.
Barry H. Dubner, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SEA PIRACY, DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Martinus Nijhoff Pub!. 1980).
2.
Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action,
WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, Policy Brief #11, at 7 (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://
http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_ l l .pdf [hereinafter Rotberg].
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 7-8.
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contested compact will be difficult." 5 The various ocean carriers would feel a
powerful economic incentive to recover their ships quickly and perhaps an equally
powerful moral imperative to free their sailors rapidly. It was concluded that the
crews truly suffer-both psychologically6 and physically7-from being held
captive for months and years at a stretch. 8 "But if there were reduced profits from
piracy-if ransoms were harder to acquire-the pirates would turn elsewhere for
gainful employment."9
On June 22, 2012, an article by Michelle Weise Bodemann in the Bloomberg
News stated that the supply of dollars for ransom payments from United Kingdom
(UK) banks has dwindled since Prime Minister David Cameron created a United
Nations (UN) task force 10 in February 2012 in order to halt payments. 11 The feeling
5.
Id. at 8.
6.
The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 20ll, ICC-INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU OCEANS BEYOND
PIRACY, at 7-8 (June 22, 2012), available at http://www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_ 2011.pdf
[hereinafter Human Cost ofSomali Piracy].
Pirates inflict psychological abuse along with physical mistreabnent as they seek to terrorize
the hostages, their families, and the ship-owners in order to speed up the ransom
negotiations. They may also do it to break down solidarity between crew members. This
abuse can be quite severe, including threats of execution or acting out mock executions,
attempts to divide the crew along existing lines of division, and repeated claims that the
hostages have been abandoned and will never go home. The potential impact of this abuse
should not be discounted; although this abuse is primarily psychological and not physical, it
has significant potential for increasing suffering among hostages during and after their
captivity.
Id. at 8.
7.

Id. at 8. Hostages face varying degrees of mistreabnent and criminal acts.

According to publicly available reports, [fifty-seven percent] of hostages faced mistreabnent
at the hands of pirates .... [Twenty-six percent] of hostages suffered abuse while [fortythree percent] were used as human shields. The assessment of abuse came from
international media sources and includes extreme forms of violence against hostages. Abuse
in this case is the equivalent of assault, attempted murder, and murder.
Id. at 7-8.

8.

Human Cost ofSomali Piracy, supra note 6, at 9-10.

The assessment of human shields was derived from mother ship reports by NATO, EU
NA VFOR, piracy biogs (e.g. Captain, Eaglespeak), and open media sources. Human shields
describe hostages kept on board mother ships and used as a form of security against attacks
by naval forces or private armed guards. There are also reports that hostages may be used as
shields during fights between pirate gangs in their disputes over "ownership" of hostages
and ransoms.
Id. at 8.
9.
Rotberg, supra note 2, at 8.
10.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Somali Pirates Battled in London as Banks Curb Dollar Supply,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-22/somali-piratesbattled-in-london-as-british-banks-curb-dollars.
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is one of three task forces operated by Combined
Maritime Forces (CMF).
In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and in cooperation with
non-member forces, CTF-151 's mission is to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and to
engage with regional and other partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities
in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation ....
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was that governments would spend "almost $1.3 billion in 2011 on military
interventions including naval patrols ... seeking to restrict payments because they
encourage more hijacking by pirates in Somalia, the world's fifth-poorest nation." 12
The end result is that the bank encouraged ship owners to get back the 227
seafarers and 12 vessels still being held hostage. 13 The question becomes whether
the pirates will take out their frustrations on the abducted crew if the ransom is not
paid. 14 This raises a follow-up question of whether seamen are worth as much as
cargo on a ship? By not paying ransom suppliers, will piracy cease to exist? In
order to answer the questions raised, it is important to understand the scope of the
piracy situation today.

In conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NA VFOR), and together with independently deployed
naval ships, CTF 151 helps to patrol the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
(IRTC} in the Gulf Aden.
CTG-15 I: Counter-piracy, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-15 l-counterpiracy/ (last visited May 2, 2013).
11.
Bockmann, supra note I 0.
The fight against Somali pirates, responsible for hijacking about 170 vessels in four years, is
starting to draw in British banks, until now a major source of the stacks of dollars used to
pay ransoms .... Ransoms reached $160 million last year, according to One Earth Future
Foundation, a nonprofit group based in Broomfield, Colorado....
Payments to pirates operating off Somalia averaged $4.7 million a vessel this year,
according to the European Union naval force patrolling the region. The pirates hijacked
more than 170 ships since 2008 and took about 3,400 seafarers hostage, according to the
IMB.

Cameron held a conference of more than 40 nations in February to discuss restoring stability
to Somalia and announced the creation of the International Pirate Ransoms Task Force,
which met for the first time May 30. Members include the U.K., U.S., and Panama and
Liberia, which have the two biggest ship registries. U.K. banks are concerned they may face
penalties in the future for being involved in such transactions, [Michele] White [the general
counsel to the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners) said.
"The very existence of the task force is making the payments much more difficult," she
said, citing insurers and lawyers in London directly involved in ransom negotiations. "The
ransom lawyers are on the very margins of their ability to raise physical dollars to pay
ransoms."
Id.

12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.

"The only way you release a crew is by payment," said Cyrus Mody, the assistant director
of the International Maritime Bureau in London, which tracks piracy. "It's true that ransoms
are the key fact that keep piracy going, but unless there's another option available, then
pirates are going to take out their fiustrations on the crew if they aren't paid."
Id.
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I. ON THE STATUS OF SEA PIRACY-STATISTICS DO NOT TELL THE ENTIRE
TALE ON THE STATUS OF SEAMEN BEING HELD AS HOSTAGES

"There are 785,000 seafarers in the world, thirty-five percent of whom are
Filipinos." 15 According to Major General Howes, "[Seafaring] is a pretty miserable
life and the people who engage in it do what they do, but expecting them to do
much more than that is sometimes problematic." 16
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) 17 publishes statistics of piracy and armed robbery against ships each year, on
a daily, quarterly, semi-annually and annual basis. 18 From the period beginning
January 1 to December 31, 2012, the IMB received a report of seventy-five
incidents attributed to Somali pirates. 19 The geographic area20 of these incidents
extends from the southern part of the Red Sea into the Gulf of Oman, up to twentysix degrees north. 21 In the past, incidents have been as far east as seventy-six
degrees, extending south up to twenty-two degrees. 22
During the period of the IMB Report (January 2012-December 2012), there
were a total of 585 seafarers taken hostage 23-six were killed and twenty-eight
injured. 24 Further, thirteen attacks were reported in the Gulf of Aden and thirteen
attacks were reported in the southern Red Sea. 25 During this same period, twentyeight vessels were hijacked. 26
More importantly, as of December 31, 2012, suspected Somali pirates were
holding eight vessels for ransom, with 127 crew members of different nationalities

15.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2010--12, H.C. 1318, at Ev 15
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20I012/cmselect/cmfafl71318/1318.pdf
[hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE].
16.
Id. ("There is a dynamic tension here: they are commercial actors and the whole business of arming
themselves goes completely counter to their whole tradition and method.").
17.
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report: Report for the Period I January - 31
December 2012, ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, at 2 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter ICCIMB 2012].
The ICC International Maritime Bureau (!MB) is a specialised [sic] division of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The IMB is a non-profit making organisation
[sic], established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime
crime and malpractice. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its resolution A
504 (XII) (5) and (9) adopted on 20 November 1981, has inter alia, urged governments, all
interests and organization to cooperate and exchange information with each other and the
IMB with a view to maintaining and developing a coordinated action in combating maritime
fraud.
Id.

18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 20.
20.
Id. ("Somali pirate attacks cover a vast area which includes the Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, off
Yemen, off Oman/Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, off Somalia, off Kenya, off Tanzania, off Seychelles, off
Madagascar, off Mozambique, Indian Ocean, off West and South India and off Maldives west coast.").
21.
Id.
22.
ICCIM82012,supranote 17,at20.
23.
Id. at 11.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 5.
26.
Id. at 11.
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as hostages on board. 27 Furthermore, at the end of 2012, twenty-three of the
kidnapped crew members were being held hostage on land. 28 "These Somali pirates
are quite opportunistic in that they have attacked general cargo vessels, bulk
carriers, all types of tankers, RORO vessels, 29 container vessels, fishing vessels,
sailing yachts, tugs and dhows."30
TYPE OF VESSELS ATTACKED JANUARY-DECEMBER 2012

Barge

31

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2

Barge Carrier
Pipe Layer Vessel
Research Vessel
Wood Chips Carrier
Salvage Vessel
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
LNG Tanker

5
5

Fishing Vessel

6
7

Offshore Supply Ship

10
General Cargo

5
17

22

Product Tanker

3
Container

39
5

66

Bulk Carrier

0

20

40

60

80

27.
Id. at 20, 34.
28.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 20.
29.
Roll-on/Roll-off, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/roll-on%2Froll-off (last
visited May 2, 2013) RORO vessels denote "a cargo ship or ferry designed so that vehicles can be driven straight
on and straight off." Id.
30.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 13, 20.
Dhow is the generic name of a number of traditional sailing vessels with one or more masts
with lateen sails used in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region .... Typically sporting long
thin hulls, dhows are trading vessels primarily used to carry heavy items, like fruit, fresh
water or merchandise, along the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh and East Afiica. Larger dhows have crews of approximately thirty, smaller ones
typically around twelve.
Dhow, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhow (last visited May 2, 2013).
31.
ICClMB 2012, supra note 17, at 14.
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As depicted in the graph above, bulk carriers were the leading type of vessel
attacked in December 2012, followed by chemical tankers, container ships, tankers,
etc. 32
Somali pirates use automatic weapons as well as Rocket Propelled Grenades
(RPG) against merchant vessels in an attempt to board and hijack the vessels. 33
When the attack is successful, the pirates sail the vessels toward the Somali coast
and thereafter demand a ransom for the release of the vessel and crew. 34 In
addition, the pirates use "mother vessels" to launch attacks at distant places from
the coast of Somalia. 35 "These 'mother vessels' usually hijack dhows or ocean
going fishing vessels."36 The usual pirate skiff can only go out so far into the
ocean; however, "[t]he 'mother vessel' is able to proceed very far out to sea to
launch smaller boats or skiffs to attack and hijack unsuspecting passing vessels. "37
A. The Environmental Cost of Prohibiting Ransoms
Ships could suffer serious damage that could lead to pollution, loss of life, or
environmental devastation. 38 The scariest of these type of attacks would include a
situation where a chemical tanker is attacked, the crew is disabled, and the ship
leaks or causes chemical pollution to the environment. 39 No statistics show what
type of chemicals these ships might carry. 4 Fortunately, to date, there have been
no significant incidents involving an ecological disaster caused by pirate attacks. 41
However, it is not difficult to imagine the extensive damage that might be caused
in the aftermath of such an attack. Abhyankar states, "The IMB is convinced that,
because there will be no second chance with an oil-spill, a pro-active attitude to the

°

32.
Id. Professor Dubner has written in the past about marine environment and the threat that the massive
escalation in the nature of weapons that are being used in pirate attacks, as well as the growing risk in connection
therewith of ships carrying dangerous cargos, such as oils and chemicals.
Id. at 22.
33.
Id.
34.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 22. "Many past attacks have taken place more than 1,000 nm from the
Somali coast (towards Indian west and south coast in the Indian Ocean)." Id.
38.
See generally Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster-Two Problems that
Defy the "Norms" of the International Law ofSea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. I (1997).
See generally Id.; ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 20 (Since most of the attacks involve the use of
39.
weapons, this poses a serious threat not only to injury and death of seafarers but also the ship, cargo and
environment.).
40.
Id.
41.
It is not for lack of considering this threat. See Charles Marts, Piracy Ransoms-Conflicting
ONE
EARTH
FUTURE
FOUNDATION
(Aug.
13,
2010),
available
at
Perspectives,
http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Ransom-%20Charlie%20Marts.pdf (citing Abdi Guled & Abdi Shei,
Somali Pirates Haul in Record Ransom for Oil Tanker, REUTERS (Jan.
18,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/18/us-somalia-piracy-idUSTRE60H3WB20100118) (noting that a rival
pirate faction threatened to set fire to a tanker unless they received a share of the captors ransom).
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possibility is essential and it would be fool-hardy to the point of irresponsibility not
to take all possible measures to prevent the first one.'"'2
Known environmental concerns are just ·one additional way pirates could gain
the upper hand in the future to demand ransom monies on their timeline. For
example, by purposefully opening cargo hatches aboard a captured vessel laden
with coal-an act that threatened to overheat the cargo-pirates have increased
pressure on timely ransom negotiations. 43 "This type of overheating can lead to
fire, which might destroy the vessel and cause extensive pollution."44
"Additionally, the difficulty of safely navigating a vessel to an anchorage along the
Somali shore could result in accidental grounding and a catastrophic spill. '"'5
Researchers have duly noted that "[a]n ecological disaster is likely to cause
immediate and lasting problems as waters and coasts are damaged without easy,
effective, or safe means of restoration. '"'6 Also, as the average time of holding
hostages increases and the time a vessel is held in captivity by pirates lengthens,
the risk of an accidental disaster, likewise, is expected to increase. 47 From an
environmental protection standpoint, "[a] prohibition on ransoms potentially
removes the possibility of a relatively quick and minimally violent resolution to
detainment and increases the threat of ecological disaster caused by dangerous
cargo.'"'8
As far as "trends" are concerned, a total of 297 incidents have been reported. to
the IMB piracy reporting center in 2012 compared to 439 incidents for the
corresponding period in 2011. 49 Globally, twenty-eight vessels were hijacked and
585 crewmembers were taken hostage. 50 An additional 174 vessels were boarded
with sixty-seven attempted attacks and twenty-eight vessels fired upon. 51 At least
six crew members were killed in 2012. 52 The good news is that there has been a
decrease in the overall number of incidents reported primarily due to a noticeable
decline in Somali piracy activity, which is down from 439 in 2011 to 297 in 2012. 53
The number of vessels hijacked by pirates has also dropped from forty-five in 2011
to twenty-eight in 2012. 54 However, it was reported that in 2012, that 585 crew
members were taken hostage by pirates. 55 As of December 31, 2012, the Somali
42.
Marts, supra note 41, at 17 (citing Jayant Abhyankar, Int'/ Chamber of Commerce, Int'/ Maritime
Bureau, Piracy and Maritime Violence: A Continuing Threat to Maritime Industry 10 (2002), available at
http://www. itopf com/_assets/documents/Abhyankar. pdl).
43.
Id. (citing Piracy: Responding to a Piracy Incident 2, INCE & Co., (2010), available at
http://incelaw.com/misc/Piracy-responding-to-a-piracy-incident/piracy-responding-to-a·piracy-incident).
44.
Id. (citing The Pitfalls of The Carriage of Coal, STEAMSHIP MUTUAL (May 2007), available at
http://www.simsl.com/Coat0407 .html).
Hijacking of Saudi Supertanker likely to Affect Gulf Crude Transport Economics, lHS GLOBAL
45.
INSIGHT (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.ihsglobatinsight.com/SDNSDADetail I 5000.htm.
46.
Marts, supra note 41, at 17.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 11.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 11.
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pirates were holding eleven vessels and 127 crew members, forty-four of which
have been held by different Somali pirate factions for more than two years. 56
From January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012, statistics based on locations
of actual and attempted attacks, by Somali pirates specifically, show that there
were ninety-two attacks in 2008; 138 attacks in 2009; eighty attacks in 2010;
seventy-seven in 2011 and twenty-six attacks in 2012. 57 The following chart
indicates that eight locations contributed to almost seventy-five percent of the total
297 incidents reported in the period between January and December 2012. 58
LOCATIONS OF REPORTED VESSEL ATTACKS IN 2012

111111 TOGO
15

II INDONESIA

81

59 66

llTOGO
1111 BANGLADESH Ill BANGLADESH
11
1111 SOMALIA
111111 GULF OF ADEN
111111 RED SEA
111111 NIGERIA
II MALAYSIA
11 INDONESIA

II SOMALIA

49

12
II NIGERIA

111111 GULF OF ADEN
13
II RED SEA
13

27

Forty-nine of the attacks occurred in Somalia, twenty-seven off the coast of
Nigeria, and the rest in Togo, Bangladesh, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and

56.
57.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 5-6.
58.
Id.
59.
The following eight locations records just under seventy-five percent of attaGks from a total of 297
reported attacks for 2012.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 6.
60.
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Malaysia. 61 Clearly, the Indonesian attacks were the most frequent. 62 The types of
arms used during the attacks included guns, common knives, and other weapons. 63
What types of violence did the hundreds of victim seafarers suffer? A total of
662 acts of violence to crew were reported in 2012; twenty-six were kidnapped,
thirteen were threatened, four were assaulted, twenty-eight were injured, and six
were killed. 64 The following tables indicate the breakdown of violence to crew
from 2008 as well as types of violence by location.

TYPES OF VIOLENCE DONE TO CREW
JANUARY 2008-DECEMBER 2012 65

Types of
violence
Assaulted

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

7

4

6

6

4

Hostage

889

1050

1174

802

585

Injured

32

69

37

42

28

Kidnap/Ransom

42

12

27

10

26

Killed

11

10

8

8

6

Missing

21

8

-

-

-

Threatened

9

14

18

27

13

Total

1011

1167

1270

895

662

Ships of various nationalities were included in the 297 attacks in 2012. 66 There
were forty-three attacks against ships registered in Singapore (open registry state),
twenty-one attacks against ships registered in Marshall Islands, and seventeen
attacks against ships registered in Hong Kong. 67 However, the countries that take
the prize for the greatest number of ships being attacked are Panama and Liberia,
incurring forty-nine and forty-five attacks respectively. 68 But of course, Liberia and

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at I 0.
Id.
Id.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 8.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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Panama, as well as many other states, have what we call "Open Registry"69 or flags
of convenience. 70
TYPES OF VIOLENCE DONE TO CREW BY LOCATION
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2012
Location

Southeast Asia

71

Hostage

Threatened

Assault

Injured

Indonesia

47

4

3

4

Malacca Straits

6

Malaysia

49

Killed

Kidnap

8
I

Philippines
Singapore Straits

19

South China Sea

16

Vietnam

1

India

Bangladesh

2

Sub
Continental

India

Far East

Ecuador

1
1

1

1
1

North America
Haiti

Africa

1

Benin

19

Cameroon

1

1

69.
Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Convenient Fishing: Participation in International Fishery Management
(2002) (Paper for presentation at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 2002) available at
http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/desombre.html#_ ftnref9 ("Open registries are generally characterized as
those that do not require citizenship of ship-owners or operators, levy no or minimal taxes, allow ships to be
worked by non-nationals, and have neither the will nor capability to impose domestic or international regulations
on registered ships.").
Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Globalization and Environmental Protection on the High Seas (2003) (Paper
70.
for presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, August 2003) available at
http:l/citation.allacademic.cornl/meta/p_ mla_ apa_research_citation/0/6/2/5/3/pages62530/p62530-6.php
[The trend], the proliferation of ship registries, arose to meet [a] desire by ship-owners [to
avoid] costly regulation as a way to keep operating costs low. For centuries ship registration
was a reasonably simple process. The owner of a ship registered it in the country he (almost
inevitably he) was a citizen of, and the ship's operations were thus covered by the laws of
that state, both domestic and international ... [w]idespread use of such flags, however,
came only with the decision by certain states beginning around the 1920s to create open
registries, where ships were not required to have onerous ties to a state in order to register.
Id.

71.

ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 11.
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Dem.
Republic
of Congo

1

Egypt

3

Ghana

2

Guinea

8

Gulfof Aden*

38

Ivory Coast

25

Kenya

1

Nigeria

61

Somalia
Togo
Sub Total
Total

1
1

1

7

4

212

1

2

79

1

585

1

13

28

4

662

*Gulf of Aden
The above attacks attributed to Somali pirates

6

26

26
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FLAG STATES WHOSE SHIPS WERE ATTACKED TwELVE TIMES OR MORE
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2012

72

60

49

so
40

30

20

10

0
Malaysia

Bahamas Hong Kong Marshall Singapore
Islands

Liberia

Panama

The significance of all of these statistics is that while the incidents of ships
being captured has dropped, the "cost" of piracy has risen. 73 According to Oceans
Beyond Piracy (OBP), 74 "there was a peak in pirate activity in early 2011 with over
700 hostages held aboard vessels off the coast of Somalia."75 In 2011, pirates
72.
Id. at 11.
73.
See generally Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6.
See, e.g., OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/pages/about-obp (last visited May
74.
17, 2013).
Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) is a project of the One Earth Future Foundation, a privately
funded and independent non-profit organization located in Colorado, USA. OBP was
launched in 2010 with the intent to develop a response to maritime piracy through:
[m]obilizing stakeholders from the maritime community; [d]eveloping public-private
partnerships to promote long-term solutions at sea and ashore; [and] [s]ustainable deterrence
based on the rule of law .... OBP believes that the answers to the piracy problem should
come from within the community of stakeholders. We work with an extensive-and
growing-number of experts to find a solution to piracy. Through meetings and workshops
we host, our research and analysis, and our development and encouragement of new crosssector partnerships, we support the international community in its efforts to bring an end to
contemporary maritime piracy.
Id.

75.

Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6, at 3.
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captured fewer seafarers reflecting a significant drop in the success rate of pirate
attacks; however, the bad news is that the length of time that seafarers are detained
has been increasing. 76
II. THE PROBLEMS FACING SEAFARERS BEING HELD HOSTAGE BY SOMALI
PIRATES

The statistical success in thwarting acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and
elsewhere is clear. 77 As far as blocking acts of piracy, the numbers look
favorable. 7s However, the human cost of Somali piracy has been abominable. 79 A
very good attempt at summarizing the two main problems regarding the crimes
committed by pirates against seafarers in the years of 2011 and 2012, and the
assessment of the overall treatment of hostages based on post-incident reports
based on twenty-three vessels that were released in either 2010 or 2011, describe
the suffering caused by the pirates and incurred by the hostages as well as their
family and loved ones.so
There were 3,863 seafarers assaulted by pirates during the initial stages of
attacks.st Of those, 968 seafarers came in close contact with all pirates on board
their vessels.s 2 44% (413) of those who came in close contact with pirates were
rescued from citadels by allied naval forces. s3 Some seamen waited hours, and in
some cases days, to be rescued as pirates fought to breech the safe room on board
the ships. s4 There were 1,206 individuals held captive in 2011 by pirate gangs. ss
These included in part: 555 seafarers who were attacked and taken hostage in
2011s6, 645 hostages captured in 2010 that remained in pirate hands in 2011,
(including 123 hostages that had been held for over one year, and 26 hostages that
had been held for over two years 87), 6 tourists, and 8 workersss.
During the period involved in 2011, thirty-five hostages died; eight were killed
by pirates during the attack after being taken captive, eight died from disease or
malnutrition caused by lack of access to adequate food, water and medical aid, and

76.
Id. at 3, 7 ("The fact that 645 people were taken in 2010 and remained hostage in 2011 highlights the
large number of attacks in late 2010, an increase in the average length of time to negotiate the ransom, and in some
cases, stalled negotiations."); see also EU NA VFOR SOMALIA, http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (last visited February
22, 2013) ("Crews held hostage by pirates often face a prolonged period of captivity, the average being 5 months
(145 days) but some hostages have been held for more than two years and eight months (1001 days).").
77.
See generally ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 11.
78.
Barry Hart Dubner & Sara Fredrickson, On the Legal Issues Regarding the Prosecution of Sea Pirates
(Including Human Rights): A Case of History Repeating Itself?, 26 TEMP. lNT'L & COMP. L.J. 233, 251 (2012).
79.
See generally Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6.
80.
Id. at 85-87.
Id. at 4.
81.
Id.
82.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6, at 4.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
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nineteen died during rescue efforts by naval vessels or escape attempts, during
which the majority of hostages were used as human shields by the pirates. 89
Account from a seafarer used as a hwnan shield: "One day pirates drew
us out (five of crew) to the open deck, told us to turn back and stand still
facing the sea side. Then we heard how they reloaded their machine guns.
We understood nothing. We saw US Navy not far and we were standing
and waiting for about two hours that pirates open the fire. It was really
horrible. After this incident I had blood spitting {like tuberculosis which in
fact I never had) and later after the release I was explained by doctor that
it was my body stress reaction. " -Anonymous Seafarer

Where did the hostages come from? Predominately, the victims came from
non-OECD 91 countries, especially from the Philippines (17%), China (9%), and
India (8%). 92 Only seven percent came from OECD countries. 93 It is estimated that
111 pirates were killed in 2011, based on data by open media sources; seventyeight pirates died in direct encounters with naval forces, three died in clashes with
Puntland security forces, and thirty died in fights with other pirates over ransoms
and hostages. 94

89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 8.
91.
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD), http://www.oecd.org/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2013). Eighteen European countries plus the United States and Canada joined forces to create
an organization dedicated to global development and originally signed the Convention on the OECD on December
14, 1960. Id. Since then, fourteen countries have become members of the Organisation. Today, thirty-four member
countries span the globe, from North and South America to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Id. They include
many of the world's most advanced countries but also emerging countries like Mexico, Chile and Turkey. Id.
92.
Human Cost ofSomali Piracy, supra note 6, at 4.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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95

As far as the treatment of the hostages is concerned, it could be characterized
as abysmal. The Human Cost Booklet is based upon reports from twenty-three
vessels that were released in either 2010 or 2011. 96 The reports set forth the
experiences of the hostages that are no longer in pirate hands; however, there are
no reports for hostages still in captivity. 97 As a result, their experiences are not
included. 98
According to the reports, all hostages faced the risk of violence day upon day
and a range of inhumane treatment in violation of their basic human rights,
including the right to life, liberty, and security of person. 99 In addition, at least
three seafarers from the twenty-three reporting vessels died after release as a direct
result of their treatment during captivity. 100 All crews were subject to restricted
freedom of movement and privacy, in addition to living under constant threat of
physical and psychological abuse. 101
Needless to say, living, hygiene, and sanitary conditions on board the hijacked
ships declined rapidly and remained deplorable throughout captivity. 102
Additionally, the reports indicate that the main triggers of physical and
psychological abuse appeared to be pirates' basic ignorance in the workings of a
ship, break down or slow progress in negotiations, disagreements among the
hostages, and better treatment to some crews in exchange for information on the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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others. 103 Notably, the reports do not take into account the stress, fears, and day-today deterioration in standards of living of the family members of the captive
crews. 104 Only half of all hostages in 2011 were subject to moderate abuse by
captors including punching, slapping, or pushing. 105 10% of hostages suffered
severe abuse which included being tied up in the sun for hours, being locked in a
freezer, or having fingernails pulled out with pliers. 106 Without a doubt, reports
suggest "nearly all hostages were in some form affected psychologically." 107

4: P~fml Mistr~~¢numt of

.i,.;iiJ6 Ho.stal~'"' ·

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Human Cost ofSomali Piracy, supra note 6, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. Reports show that

[w]hile many [hostages] were able to cope after they were released, there was [sic] some
needing more help. Due regard has been given to the sensitivities of the identities of the
crews, vessels, owners, operators, and other parties involved in each hijacking case; hence
the report only provides aggregate information on the treatment towards the hostages.
Id. "Hostages face varying degrees of mistreatment and criminal acts." Id. at 7. The lack of publicity regarding

hostages and
available data prompted the formulation of the Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence
Against Seafarers (the Washington Declaration). [This] declaration commits flag state
signatories to submit reports on seafarer welfare during captivity to the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB). As of June 2012, four of the largest flag states-Liberia, the
Marshall Islands, Panama, and the Bahamas-have signed on to the document. The intent ..
. is [that] the declaration is to provide a reliable and anonymized resource of information for
organizations seeking to help seafarers who have ... been subject[ ed] to pirate attack or
who are at risk of attack.
Id at 3. "While the Washington Declaration has provided some information on what happens in captivity, the

extent of the specific crimes committed during the period of captivity is difficult to quantify due to the limited
amount of publicly available information." Id. at 7.
108.
Human Cost of Somali Piracy, supra note 6, at 8.
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As the reader will observe, this is really "not piracy in the classic sense that the
Emperor E. Augustus, Pliny, and raiders off the Barbary Coast in 1753 would
recognise [sic]. Instead, it is hostage and ransom." 109
Although there is an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, 110 which
runs through the area of the Gulf of Aden, pirates know that there are plenty of
ships to choose from to attack. 111 There are 23 ,000 ships passing through in transit
each year containing over a trillion dollars worth of trade; and some "48,000 ships
transit the Indian Ocean," which is an even larger area. 112 The hostages could be
held anywhere along the Somali coast or inland. However, it is difficult to police
this area because there are 2.6 million square miles of water in the area. 113 The
question remains: Are the aforementioned statistics on human rights violations of
hostages accurate given there is some concern if there is a full disclosure of the use
of violence and torture by pirates in order to minimize the impact? 114 In addition,
information might be obtained from a group called "Save Our Seafarers" as well as
"the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme [MPHRP], which is
backed by the [entire maritime] industry, including the insurers, the international
group and EU NAVFOR [European Union Naval Force]." 115 The following section
of this article will address the effects ransom payments have had on the
humanitarian efforts to rescue seafarers and hostages.

III. ON THE AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS OF RANSOM AND THE PROBLEMS AND
CONNECTIONS THEREWITH

It is interesting to observe who receives the ransom monies before looking at
the actual amounts paid and the relationship to the hostages being released or not
tortured. According to Stephen Askins: 116
109.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 14.
110.
ICCIMB 2012, supra note 17, at 22 (corridor in Gulf of Aden officially named International
Recommended Transit Corridor {IRTC)). New coordinates in effect February I, 2009. Maritime
Office Marlo,
Update to
Internationally Recommended Transit
Corridor (IRTC),
Liason
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marol/Guidance/Corridor.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). For full details on the
updated IRTC, see Maritime Liaison Office Marlo. Id. See also Appendix B infra.
111.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 13.
112.
Id. at Ev 14.
113.
Id. at Ev 13.
114.
See id. at Ev 12.
115.
Id. See also EU NAVFOR, supra note 76.
[A]s part of the Comprehensive Approach to Somalia [(Somali-based piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the Hom of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean)], in December 2008
the EU launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia - Operation
Atalanta within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and
International Law in response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Hom
of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.

Id. Specifically, "Operation Atalanta is the European Union's counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia."
Id.
116.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 64. Stephen Askins is a maritime lawyer with a
specialization in "contentious maritime law (litigation as opposed to transactional law) and advising stakeholders
in maritime adventure on all respects of maritime law." Id.; see also INCE & Co, Stephen Askins,
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[O]f a $5 million dollar ransom, a percentage will go to the gangs
that held the ship; the first guy on board will get a bigger reward.
There is always a small group of investors controlling and making
decisions, and they could be serious business men or, as we found
recently, a 19-year-old with his cousin. Then there is a chunk of
money, probably about 30%, that goes into the community. There
is a lot of talk about money flowing out into Dubai and Nairobi,
but as far as I am aware, apart from the French chasing a ransom
ashore after the Le Ponant, not one dollar has been recovered from
the piracy ransoms. The logical conclusion is that enough cannot
be being done. If money is haemorrhaging [sic] out into places
such as Nairobi and Dubai, that is where the international focus
has to be, in trying to disrupt that flow of money, but I think an
awful lot of it stays in Somalia. 117

A. How High Will the Ransom Payments Go?
Apparently, there is no limit to the amount of money that will be asked for
ransom. The ransom amount is only limited by the imagination of the pirates. 118 As
Mr. Askins wisely stated:
It is like being in a housing boom where your estate agent adds on
money for the next house on the street that he is selling. It

sometimes feels very like that. There are various factors that come
into play, for example, the nationality of the crew, nationality of
the owners-anything with a US flavour will attract a greater
http://incelaw.com/ourpeople/stephen-askins (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). According to Chambers and Partners
2013, "Stephen Askins is recognised for his knowledge of piracy matters and has advised extensively on the use of
armed security." Id. His "primary area of expertise and experience is wet and dry shipping. Whilst in Greece he
headed the local Admiralty team, acting for owners and their insurers in the aftermath of maritime incidents
including salvage, wreck removal, collisions and piracy." Id. As a partner at Ince Law,
[h ]e advises on all areas of Admiralty law as well as on contractual issues arising out of
charter parties and bills of 'With the rise in piracy Stephen has developed an expertise in
advising owners and other stakeholders on the legal and practical considerations that arise as
a result of a hijacked vessel. He speaks and writes extensively on this and on issues arising
in the evolving maritime security sector. He was part of the GUARDCON drafting
committee and appeared in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee looking into piracy off
Somalia. More recently he has been part of the Industry Advisory Panel working with the
International Task Force set up to the payment of ransoms. He has worked on many high
profile maritime casualties and hijacking off both east and west Afiica including the Faina
during her hijacking off Somalia.

He was part of the team handling the Prestige oil spill and acted for salvors in the MSC
Napoli.
Id.

117.
118.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 11.
Id. at Ev I0.
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premium and a European crew will attract a greater premium-and
the size of the ship. If it is a tanker or if the ship has oil on board,
those are recognised [sic] as high-value assets for which more
money will be demanded. 119
According to Stephen Askins, during the negotiation process, there are certain
"conflicts between the insurers and the negotiators and the other interests." 120 To
begin, "a ransom needs to be funded before a deal can be done with the pirates." 121
From the start, the ship owners are likely "to self-fund the ransom before turning to
their insurers for an indemnity under the relevant policy." 122 "It is rare for cargo
interests or charterers to contribute at this stage." 123 However, once the insurers are
involved, "ransoms are paid by the property underwriters." 124 These are "the
underwriters of the hull and of the cargo. " 125 Most notably, neither of those entities
are interested by time. 126 Below is a schematic diagram of the key stakeholders
involved each time a laden vessel undertakes a voyage. 127 "It is the interaction of
those stakeholders and the contractual relationships between them which can give
rise to a number of potential conflicts when resolving the issues that arise in a
hijacking." 128
COMMERCIAL STAKEHOLDERS
War
Insurer

Hull
Insurer

K&R
Insurer

Cargo
UndeIWTiters

Charterer
Cargo
Owners
129

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at Ev 66.
Id.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,

supra note 15, at Ev 66.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
/d.atEv67.
Id. at Ev 64.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,

supra note 15, at Ev 67.
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"The third-party liability insurers, the P&I clubs [property and insurance], who
traditionally insure for loss of life and injury to crew, play no part in the ransom
payments at all. 130 That is a deliberate decision by the international group to do
that." 131 This begs the question as to whether ransom negotiations and payments
are being paid properly or if we should approach this in a different manner, a more
pragmatic approach. 132 The real problem is, however, that as the going rate of
ransom demands increases, we might end up with some small low-value ship that is
being left behind, because the demand of the pirates is greater than the value of the
ship and cargo together. 133 And in those circumstances, who will want to pay to get
the ship back? The insurers are not likely to pay 100% of the ships value. 134 "They
will pay as long as the demand is below the total loss of the ship and cargo. " 135
How does this attitude affect the crew or the hostages being held by the pirates? I
think we all know the answer to that question-the previously discussed adverse
effects on the crews and hostages.
According to Stephen Askins, "[t]here is certainly no appetite for wholesale
military action against [twenty-five] ships being held off the coast of Somalia. 136
We therefore have to go past the ]IlOral consequences, engage with the pirates and
pay them [their] ransom." 137 One would think that paying the ransoms is the proper
method of getting back the hostages. However, some government officials believe
that paying the ransoms increases the risk of piracy rather than decreases the
risk. 138 A little background is needed before discussing the current state of affairs
with regard to payment of ransoms.
B. Ransom Payments Have Been Going Up
Once a ship has been successfully hijacked, a large ransom is usually paid in
order to secure its release. 139 "The [a]verage ransom payments to Somali pirates
have increased sevenfold over the last five years, turning piracy into a multimillion dollar business. 140 • . • [F]igures show average ransoms rising from around
$600,000 in 2007 to close to [$5,000,000] in 2011." 141
As previously stated, one of the witnesses who testified before the foreign
affairs committee described inflation as "being in a housing boom." 142 Why?
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
Id.
140.
141.
increases
142.

Id. at Ev 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at Ev 10.
Id. at Ev 8.
Id.
Id. at 56, ii 112.
See Bockmann, supra note 10. "'The only way you release a crew is by payment,' said Cyrus Mody."
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 55, i1111.
Id. "The latest information from Northwood HQ is that ransom payments in 2011" showed substantial
from previous years and established new records. Id.
Id.
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Because each year there is a new record regarding the amounts of payments being
made. 143
RANSOMS PAID EACH YEAR TO SOMALI PIRATES
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Ransoms are generally paid via air drop by vessel owners or operators, or their
insurance companies, many of whom have contracts with negotiators and crisis
management consultancies. 145 The nationality of the crew and the owners, the
speed with which the ship owner paid the ransom, and the type of vessel involved
all have an impact on the amount of ransom price is demanded. 146 The highest
ransom paid as of March 2, 2011 was $12,000,000. 147 Ransom payments have
reportedly fallen recently, following an incursion by Kenyan troops into Somalia in
2011. 148 Pirates sought to conclude deals quickly, in advance of expected battles
between the Kenyan troops and Somali militants. 149

C. Should We Pay Ransoms? Arguments For and Against This Policy
According to the Foreign Affairs Report, the shipping and insurance industries
have faced criticism from government officials, because critics argue that by
143.

See id. at 56 (chart showing ransoms paid each year to Somali pirates).
Id.
145.
Id. at 56, ii 111.
146.
Id.
147.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 56, ii 111. "Between $10 million and $12 million was
reported to have been paid for the release of the Tanker Zirkn in June 2011. Prior to this, the South Korean oil
tanker the Samho Dream was widely reported in 2010 to have been released for $9.5 million." Id at n.208. $11
million was paid for the Greek oil tanker MV Irene in 2011. Id.
148.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 56, ii 111.
149.
Id.; see also Bernard Sanga, East Africa: Kenya's Somali Incursion Cuts Piracy Costs in Indian Ocean,
BUSINESS DAILY (Nov. 9, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201111091257.html.
144.
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.

paying such large ransoms, it encourages and funds more sea piracy. 150 In fact,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared before the United States Senate
Appropriations Committee in 2011 and expressed exasperation, proclaiming that "a
lot of major shipping companies in the world think it's the price of doing business.
They pay the ransom and they just go along their merry way. That has been a huge
problem." 151 On the other hand, submissions by the maritime industry to the
Foreign Affairs Committee stressed the fact that, if the ransoms were not paid,
there would be no other way to secure the release of the crews. 152 These ship
owners and insurance carriers have "to go past the moral consequences," and get to
the part of paying the ransom. 153
It was once believed that the fishermen who operated along the Somali
coastline of the Indian Ocean became disgruntled and financially motivated
because international trawlers were illegally fishing in Somali waters. 154 This led
the fishermen to form the criminal gangs known today as the Somali pirates. 155
Even if Somali pirates tended to treat hostages well in the past and were only
interested in ransom, it is obvious these pirates lacked any moral value of human
life. 156 "These gangs dominate the piracy trade and have become increasingly
violent as international navies attempt to crackdown on their activities." 157 In 2012,
Somali pirates proved their disregard for human life by killing in order to send a
message to negotiators to heed to their ransom demands. 158 While this is believed
to be the first time Somali pirates have killed a hostage because of a delay in
ransom, Hassan Abdi, a pirate commander in Haradhere town, a key pirate center,
said that the "killing was a message to the owners of the ship who paid no heed to
our ransom demands. . . . More killings will follow if they continue to lie to uswe have lost patience with them. Two years is enough." 159
Ransom payments are referred to in places as "humanitarian." 160 As far as the
Chairman of the Roundtable of International Shipping Associations (Roundtable) is
150.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 56, ir 112.
151.
Id. (quoting U.S. looking al New Moves on Somalia Piracy: Clinton, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/201l/03/03/us-somalia-piracy-usa-idUSTRE7217V820110303).
152.
Id. at 56-57, 'IJ 112.
Id. at 57, 'IJ I 12.
153.
154.
Somali Pirates
Claim
to
Kill Hostage
Over Ransom Delay,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Apr. 28, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_ news/2012/09/0l /13610217-somali-pirates-claim-tokill-hostage-over-ransom-delay?lite.
155.
See id. "Somali pirates who have been holding a hijacked ship for nearly two years killed a Syrian
hostage crew member and wounded another to protest delayed ransom payment, a pirate leader said." Id.
The Panama-flagged, bulk cargo vessel owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates
was hijacked in December 2010 off Seychelles after being fired at with rocket propelled
grenades and small arms. The pirate group threatens more deaths, as they have lost their
patience in waiting for a payment over a two-year span.

Syrian Hostage Killed by Somali Pirates Over Delayed Ransom, MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/syrian-hostage-killed-by-somali-pirates-over-del.ayed-ransom.
I 56.
Syrian Hostage Killed by Somali Pirates Over Delayed Ransom, supra note 155.
157.
Id.
158.
Somali Pirates Claim to Kill Hostage Over Ransom Delay, supra note I 54.
159.
Id.
160.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 57, if I 12.
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concerned, governments should do more to protect seafarers against piracy. 161
However, on behalf of the UK government, Prime Minister David Cameron
indicated recently at a conference on Somalia that "creating an international task
force to discourage the payment of ransoms to pirates and other groups to eliminate
the profit motive" was not the proper method of dealing with this situation. 162 In
fact, the Roundtable thought that any action taken by government to discourage
payment for ransom ignores the plight of those being held hostage and those that
risk their freedom and their life working on ships in the region. 163 Despite all of the
military engagements and the high level of compliance with the Best Management
Practices (BMPs), 164 and although armed guards are being placed on ships, vessels
are still being hijacked. 165
Importantly, "the only option available to ship-owners [that wish] to secure the
release of hijacked seafarers is to negotiate a payment of a ransom." 166 If
governments decide "to hinder or prevent such ransom payments, [it is believed
that this] would seriously and unnecessarily expose seafarers and deprive shipowners of their last means of protecting ... their employees at sea." 167

161.
See generally Letter from Yudhishthir Khatau, Chairman-BIMCO et al., to The Rt Hon David
Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter BIMCO Letter]. According to their
website,
BIMCO [Baltic and International Maritime Council] is a shipping association providing a
wide range of services to its global membership of stakeholders who have vested interests in
the shipping industry, including ship-owners, operators, managers, brokers and agents.
The association's main objective is to facilitate the commercial operations of its
membership by means of developing standard contracts and clauses, and providing quality
information, advice, and education.
B!MCO promotes fair business practices, free trade and open access to markets and is a
strong advocate for the harmonisation and standardisation of all shipping related activity.
Accredited as a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) with all relevant United Nations
agencies and other regulatory entities, B!MCO actively promotes the application of
international agreed regulatory instruments.

About BIMCO, BIMCO, https://www.bimco.org/About/About_BIMCO.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2013).
162.
BIMCO Letter, supra note 161.
163.
Id.
164.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 65 (Best Management Practices ("BMPs") are in
their 4th edition ("BMP4"), which sets out guidelines (not rules) "regarding best practices for dealing with the
threat of hijacking by pirates"); see also FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 19, iJ 24:
BMPs are the most prominent example of a constructive industry response to piracy [that
were] developed by shipping industry organizations in cooperation with the naval
operations, to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia.
These include recommendations on speed, information on typical pirate attacks, and 'self
protection measures' including watch-keeping, maneuvering practice, water spray and foam
monitors and citadels-fortified safe rooms to which crew can retreat and await military
assistance.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM!TIEE, supra note 15, at 19, iJ 24.
165.
BIMCO Letter, supra note 161.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
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To be specific, the immediate implications of hindering or
preventing ransom payments would include [the following]: [a]ll
of the seafarers currently held in captivity by Somali pirates would
be left at the mercy of violent organized crime in a society where
life has little value; [s]eafarers may very well refuse to sail in the
high risk area when faced with the prospect of no release should
they be taken hostage which would have a severe negative impact
on world trade; [i]nsurance premiums for vessels would become
prohibitive as the vessels and cargoes held would be lost at a
significant cost to the insurance industry; [s]hips abandoned to
their fate off the Somali coast will place the ocean environment at
risk. The combination of risk and insurance rates would ultimately
cause the majority of ships to avoid the region completely thus
having an immeasurable impact on food aid and the regional
economy, as well as on world trade costs. 168
"Should [any] government decide to criminalize ransom payments, shipowners can no longer be expected to share a responsibility" for any government
action beyond the ship-owners' control. 169 "In those circumstances, the fate of the
seafarers held for ransom will become the responsibility of governments, including
any consequential collateral damage to life or property." 170
Attention is also drawn to the United States (U.S.) Presidential Executive
Order 171 on banning ransom payments to known individuals. 172 The Roundtable
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Exec. Order No. 13620, 77 Fed. Reg. 43483, 43483-84 (July 20, 2012). Order titled "Taking
Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Somalia" reads in part:

(a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States ... are blocked and
may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in:
. . . any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State:
(A) to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or
stability of Somalia, including but not limited to:
(1) acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political
process;
(2) acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions or future Somali governing
institutions, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMlSOM), or other future
international peacekeeping operations related to Somalia; or
(3) acts to misappropriate Somali public assets;
(8) to have obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or
distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

(C) to have directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to Somalia, or to have been
the recipient in the territory of Somalia of, arms or any related materiel, or any technical
advice, training or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to
military activities;
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team pointed out that they "had significant co-operation and assistance from the
U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)." 173 The "concern is focused entirely
on the possibility of ransom payments reaching the Special Designated individuals
named in the U.S. Executive Order, in contrast to stopping all ransom payments, as
implied by [Prime Minister David Cameron's] statement." 174 However, reflecting
on the Maersk Alabama attack in 2009, where "twenty sailors [fell] under the
control of four armed [pirates] ... which was the largest kidnapping of American
citizens in the last several years," the Obama administration was put under
pressure. 175 In response, "the [U.S.] has taken a hard line against kidnappings of

(D) to be responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or
otherwise directing, or to have participated in, the commission of acts of violence targeting
civilians in Somalia, including killing and maiming, sexual and gender-based violence,
attacks on schools and hospitals, taking hostages, and forced displacement;
(E) to be a political or military leader recruiting or using children in armed conflict in
Somalia;
(F) to have engaged, directly or indirectly, in the import or export of charcoal from
Somalia on or after February 22, 2012;
(G) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical or
technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the activities described in
subsections (a)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section or any person whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
(H) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to this order.

Id.
172.
Jason Straziuso, Obama Memo Triggers Corifusion Over Legality Of Pirate Ransoms, INSURANCE
JOURNAL (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2010/04/22/109187.htm. President
Obama issued Executive Order 13536 on April 13, 2010, which
appears to make criminally punishable any act of providing financial aid directly or
indirectly to any person or entity classified as a "Specially Designated National" (SDN) by
the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OF AC), or to any person or entity that is determined
by the Treasury and State departments to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia.
Marts, supra note 41 (citation omitted).
173.
BIMCO Letter, supra note 161.
174.
Id.; The concerns referred to Marts asserts:
The OFAC [(Office of Foreign Assets Control)] list of Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) now includes at least two people who are linked to both piracy and terrorism. Upon
issuance of Executive Order 13536, the President issued an accompanying statement to
Congress making it clear that the Administration views piracy as a threat to U.S. national
interests and seeks to undercut financial support for piratical activities.
Marts, supra note 41, at 24 (citations omitted).
175.
Matthias Gebauer, Somali Pirates Up the Ante, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK: GLOBAL ECONOMICS
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-04-09/somali-pirates-up-the-antebusinessweekbusiness-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice ('The White House often risks the lives of hostages before it
accepts blackmail from kidnappers. For the same reason, the US is quicker to try to free hostages by force.").
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American citizens." 176 "Paying ransom-a routine strategy m Europe-[seems
theoretically] out of the question in Washington, D.C." 177
D. Are Ransom Payments Legal Under English and American Laws?

The answer to this question is yes. 178 Under English law:
[T]he option to pay a ransom is one that [has been] recognized ...
unambiguously and confirmed by the High Court and Court of
Appeals in [the case of] Masefield v Amlin, where it was also
recognized by the judiciary as a longstanding and important feature
of the insurance market." [Further,] Mr. Justice Steele [actually]
acknowledged that there is no public interest in stopping ransom
payments. [Moreover,] [t]he House of Lords EU [European Union]
Affairs Committee likewise supported 'the status quo whereby
payment of ransoms to pirates is not a criminal offence under UK
law.' 179
[So,] [r]ansom payments are not illegal under the UK law except
for cases in which there was evidence that the payment [was
utilized to] trigger another crime. (For example, the British]
Government has stated ... that 'payment of a ransom to a United
Nations designated terrorist group or individual would contravene
the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanction regime established by UN
Security Resolution 1267 (1999).' [However,] [t]his approach is
not shared by all states, some of which are known to have paid
ransoms, and/or . become involved in the ransom negotiation
process when their citizens are held hostage. [With that said, the]
industry has been broadly supportive of the UK's approach.
According to Stephen Askins: '[i]n a commercial sense, we would
rather there was minimum government involvement in the
negotiation process. They can help where help is called for, but
· 176.
Matthias Gebauer, Somali Swashbucklers: Pirates Extend their Hunting Grounds, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 9, 2009, 12:26 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/somalia-swashbucklerspirates-extend-their-hunting-grounds-a-6183 74.html.
177.
Id.
178.
See infra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
179.
BIMCO Letter, supra note 161; In Masefield AG vAmlin Corporate Member (2011) EWCA Civ 24,
[T]he Court of Appeal was asked to decide (i) if the taking of a vessel and its cargo
amounted to an actual total loss; and (ii) if ransom payments by ship-owners to pirates were
as a matter of English law against public policy. In finding for Owners, the Court held that
whilst each capture by pirates needed to be viewed on the facts, capture in itself was not
sufficient to trigger an actual total loss. The Court also reaffirmed the decision at first
instance that ransom payments to pirates are not against English public policy and therefore
legal.
Philip
Roche
et
al.,
Shipping
Newsletter-Legalseas,
NORTON
ROSE
http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/pub Iications/49711 /shipping-newsletter-legalseas.

(Apr.

2011),
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generally we get it, we understand it, we have a process and, on a
commercial level, it works.' 180
There has been "concern about possible international attempts to prohibit the
payment of ransoms, which 'would further endanger the seafarers held captive and
any prohibition would serve only to drive ransom payments underground. "' 181
"[T]he fact that ransom payments in 2011 have already totalled [sic] $135
[million], another all-time record, should be a matter of deep concern to the British
Government and to the entire international maritime community." 182 "An estimated
$300 million has been paid to Somali pirates over the last four years and, aside
from a French operation on land following an attack on some [of] its citizens, none
of this ransom money has been recovered." 183
"As the amounts of money involved have increased, international attention has
shifted toward efforts to understand the financial flows involved in piracy, both as
a way of tackling piracy through apprehending investors and due to concerns that
ransom money is funding organized crime [and] terrorism." 184 In conclusion, the
Foreign Affairs Committee Report stated that "the government should not pay or
assist in the payment of ransoms but nor should it make it more difficult for
companies to secure the safe release of their crew by criminalizing the payment of
ransoms." 185 Also, after recognizing that the British Government was
"disappointingly slow to take action on financial flows related to ransom
payments," 186 the report concluded that "the Government's laudable principle not
to become involved in ransom payments should not extend to the point of failing to
collect, analyse [sic] and act upon information concerning ransom payments made

180.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 57, '11113.
181.
ld.at57,,1114.
182.
Id. at 58, i1115.
183.
Id. at 58, ii 116.
184.
Id. at 58, ii 117. "There is very little solid information about where this money goes, in large part
because ransom payments are in the form of physical cash and the money trail generally grows cold after the
ransom is delivered." (citing Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping/or Ransom, Financial Action
Task Force Report, July 2011, P 5, ii 4). Id. at 58, ii 116;
Most observers agree that it is to some extent shared between the pirate "foot soldiers" and
investors. However, there are also fears that the money reaches corrupt Somali officials,
Somali terrorist groups such as al-Shabab, and international criminal groups who fund the
piracy from abroad and channel the proceeds out of Somalia into banks in Dubai and even
London.
Id. at 58, iJ 116.

185.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 58, i1115.
186.
Id. at 59, ii 118. As of June 2011, Mr. Henry Bellingham MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,
Minister for Africa, the UN, Overseas Territories Conflict Issues) stated that
in the early days of payment of ransoms we were talking about a few million US dollars; we
are now talking about a total amount of about $300 million. Serious sums of money are
washing around different world financial centres and systems. Understanding where that
money goes, disrupting it and going after the kingpins is incredibly important. We have had
some success, but there is much more to do.
Id. at Ev 49.
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by British companies to private individuals" 187 The Committee also recommended
that the British Government "establish a mechanism through which intelligence
and information about ransom payments and pirate groups and negotiations can be
communicated to the Government by those involved." 188

E. On the Attempt to Curtail Piracy Ransom Payments
The representatives of seafarers (e.g., the British Chamber of Shipping) were
concerned that the "US legislative actions to curtail piracy by means of an
Executive Order signed by US President [Barack Obama], which [had] the
potential to block payments to certain individuals [named in the Executive Order,]
on the grounds that [those individuals contributed] to the conflict in Somalia." 189
Some countries have implemented the United Nations Security Council's
resolution. 190 The International Chamber of Commerce, the Lloyds Market
Association, and other such entities and persons, "remain[] very concerned that any
[other] attempts to prohibit the payment of ransoms would further endanger the
seafarers held captive." 191
A witness appearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing stated that
"[u]nless we change our law to make the payment of ransoms illegal, our policy of
discouraging it will continue." 192 He went on to give an anecdotal example of an
event that had occurred recently and was covered by the press, as follows:
People who were carrying a ransom arrived at Mogadishu airport
with, I think, US$2.5 million. They were apprehended by the TFG
[(Temporary Federal Government)] and were up in the court the
following day, where they were convicted and given lengthy
prison sentences. We dealt with that as a consular case. We did not
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 59, ii 119.
Id.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 63.
The introduction to the Security Council's Resolutions reads as follows:

United Nations resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations
organs. They generally consist of two clearly defined sections: a preamble and an operative
part. The preamble generally presents the considerations on the basis of which action is
taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given. The operative part states the opinion of the
organ or the action to be taken.
United Nations Documentation: Research Guide, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/
scres.htrn (last visited May 3, 2013).
191.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 63. Because no direct links are thought to exist
between pirate groups and terrorist organizations, the industry believes military counter-piracy operations are
distinct and should remain separate from anti-terrorist operations. As such,
[a]n additional and unwelcome development for shipping companies in 2010 concerned US
legislative actions to curtail piracy by means of an Executive Order signed by US President
[Obama] on 13 April, which has the potential to block payments to certain individuals on
the grounds that they may be contributing to the conflict in Somalia.
Id.
192.

Id. at Ev 49.
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say that the TFG were wrong to prosecute those people for paying
a ransom, which is against their law. In that case, there has been a
presidential pardon-the men have been released, but the money
has been confiscated by the TFG, and I understand the assets as
well, such as vehicles and aircraft. 193
The irony of the situation seems to be that the government of Great Britain is
sanctioning payments on the one hand, "yet it is the policy of the Government to
discourage payments," certainly an inconsistent approach. 194 The response to that
conclusion was made by Mr. BellinghamI 95 where he stated that although the
Foreign Office is "aware that payments are made," they "do not have evidence of
money finding its way through the financial services institutions in [London]." 196
He further stated:
We don't have evidence that there is money ending up in London.
If there was evidence of this, then we would be able to go after the
guys. That is why we are making this a bigger priority, putting
more money into Interpol, into UNODC, understanding more
about how these financial flows are structured. 197
Many of the problems that hostages face come about because of the laxity of
responsibility on behalf of the flag states. Much of the "complex and opaque
operating structures of much of the industry-such as flags of convenience and
'brassplate' shell companies I98 that have no genuine link to the country of vessel
ownership and the nationality of the crew." 199 As such, this only:
[H]elp[s] erode [the] accountability and responsibility and generate
extremely difficult complexities from the jurisdictional
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id. at Ev 37.
196.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at Ev 50.
197.
Id.
198.
"Brass plate" companies are also known as IBCs (international business companies) or "shell
companies," which are special purpose entities.
These companies are incorporated in small economies with international financial centers,
have no physical presence in that jurisdiction, have all their assets, liabilities, and operations
elsewhere, and are usually owned by nonresidents of the jurisdiction of incorporation.
Typically, the requirements of the country of incorporation are minimal beyond payment of
registration fees. The registration is usually undertaken by a local service provider who is
the only contact and who has little or no idea of the activities of the companies. While
service providers are required to know the name of the owner(s) in most jurisdictions, that
information is not public and accounts do not need to be maintained or lodged.

Fourteenth Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics: Note on the Application of the
Residence Concept to Small Economies with International Financial Centers, STATISTICS DEPARTMENT
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2001/01-13.pdf (last
visited May 3, 2013).
199.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at Ev 103 (internal footnote added).
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perspective. Diplomatic sensitivities and concerns [of the] national
sovereignty often provide obstacles to cooperation between
relevant authorities or at regional and international level, whilst
many governments lack adequate laws and judicial capacity to
N:'.
•
ly prosecute suspected pirates.
.
200
e11ect1ve
CONCLUSION

The treatment of seafarers and their families is an abomination. 201 It was
especially shocking to read an article that appeared in the New York Times dated
July 17, 2012 regarding protections afforded to pirate kingpins. 202 According to the
article, the corruption in Somalia exists to such an extent that President Sheik
Sharif Sheik Ahmed issued a diplomatic passport to a top pirate leader in order to
shield him from arrest. 203 The United Nations refers to this type of corruption as a
crime of "'impunity' enjoyed by pirate kingpins in Somali and abroad."204 A
"United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia . . . report[ ed] to the Security
Council ... that senior pirate leaders were benefiting from high level protection
from Somali authorities .... " 205 The pirate leader, Mohamed Abdi Hassan, had ;m
authorized diplomatic passport when he presented it to the Malaysian immigration
authorities. 206 The Somali president defended the passport as part of the larger
strategy to dismantle the pirate network. 207 "The [UN] Monitoring Group . . .
submitted two confidential cases to the Security Council documenting the flow of
piracy proceeds via international accounts and singling out a Somali businessman

200.
Id.
201.
Human Cost ofSomali Piracy, supra note 6, at 4.
202.
Somalia: President is Shielding Pirate Leader, U.N. Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/africa/somal ia-president-is-shielding-pirate-leader-unreport-says.html?_ r=O.
President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, ... has shielded a top pirate leader from arrest by
issuing him a diplomatic passport, according to a United Nations inquiry, which criticizes
the 'climate of impunity' enjoyed by pirate kingpins in Somalia and abroad. The United
Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia said in a report to the Security Council that senior
pirate leaders were benefiting from high-level protection from Somali authorities and were
not being sufficiently sought by international authorities. The group said a diplomatic
passport had been provided 'with the authorization of Mr. Ahmed to Mohamed Abdi
Hassan, a pirate leader also known as Afweyne, who presented it to authorities in Malaysia
on a trip there in April. The report said Mr. Ahmed said the passport was "one of several
inducements' for Afweyne aimed at dismantling his pirate network. Mr. Ahmed, in a letter
to the chairman of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, called the report 'one-sided'
and described its contents as 'unsubstantiated allegations.'

Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Somali Pirate Kingpins Enjoy "Impunity," REUTERS (July 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/20 I 2/07/17/us-somalia-un-piracy-idUSBRE86GOZN20120717.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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with British citizenship who [was involved in] a piracy ring [and] runs a counterpiracy business."208
As this is going on, seafarers languish in miserable conditions while the
various governments decide if they want to allow monies to flow through to pirates
in order to pay off ransoms. 209 In addition, there have been billions and billions of
dollars spent on piracy off the coast of Somalia in order to build prisons and set up
various legal systems, as well as to improve the conditions of the life of the Somali
people. 210 These are admirable goals. However, it is hard to sit back without a little
degree of cynicism when thinking that some of this money could be used to simply
buy out the few thousand pirates that exist.2 11 In any event, when asked whether
ransom monies should continue to be paid, the answer is a resounding "YES!"

208.
Id.
209.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 57, ii 114.
210.
See Barry Hart Dubner & Ritvik Raturi, On the Economics of International Sea Piracy-A Case of
History Repeating Itself, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 745 (2012).
211.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITIEE, supra note 15, at 57, ii 6.
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APPENDIX A
SOMALI PIRACY-KEY FACTS

212

- Over 1,000 Somali pirates are awaiting trial, or serving custodial sentences,
in 20 countries.
Somali pirate attacks increased in the first half of 2011, but the pirate
success rate of one success per five attacks (20%) is well below the
historical average. This reflects:
o (of primary importance) a marked increase in the implementation of
Best Management Practice and ship self-protection measures by
merchant vessels;
o a number of successful uses of "citadels" (safe rooms);
o an increase in the number of disruptions conducted by international
counter-piracy forces, and
o there have also been an increasing number of incidents in which armed
private security guards have played a role in successfully repelling
attacks.
The critical Gulf of Aden trade artery-the key UK commercial interest
and original pirate focus-remains largely secure for UK and other
international shipping, with no successful pirate attack since November
2010.
RANSOMS

US$

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Total

Number

8

19

39

25

19

105

Average
Paid

600K

1.3m

1.9m

3.19m

4.7m

Annual
Total

5m

25m

76m

79.8m

88.3m

212.

Id. at Ev 69-70.

274.3m
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ATTACKS

Pirated

Total

2008

Unsuccessful
Attacks
10

2

12

2009

117

46

163

2010

127

47

174

2011

101

19

120

At anchorage:
o 17 ships currently held
o 393 hostages currently held
Detention:
o 134 days average length of detention, and
o 446 days longest length of detention.
OPERATING AREA

3,900 km coastline of Somalia.
2.6 [million] square miles size of Area of Operations.
23,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden per year.
97 WFP 213 & 102 AMISOM 214 escorted since [December 2008) (EU).

213.

The United Nations World Food Program (WFP):
is the United Nations' organization designated by the international community to provide
humanitarian food aid. Worldwide, WFP feeds 90 million people in more than 70 countries
annually. According to WFP, "At any given time, [it] has 30 ships at sea, 70 aircrafts in the
sky and 5,000 trucks on the ground, moving food and other assistance to where it is needed
most." Large storage facilities within proximity of the famine areas, like Djibouti, Kenya
and South Africa, allow WFP to pre-position and stockpile food for a prompt response to
the Somalia emergency. Piracy off the coast of Somalia is an additional obstacle to food
delivery for the famine. Humanitarian aid vessels are not exempt from the threat piracy
poses to the global shipping industry traversing the coastline waters of Somalia. Food aid
traveling from Djibouti to Mogadishu must traverse the narrow straits of the Gulf of Aiden
and the long Indian Ocean coastline to the Somali harbors in Mogadishu and Bossasso.

Pearl
Alice
Marsh,
Getting Humanitarian
Food Aid to Somalia,
ONE,
available
at
http://www.one.org/us/201 J/09/20/getting-humanitarian-food-aid-to-somalia/ (last visited May 3, 2013).
214.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMJSOM) was launched first in Mogadishu by the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union, with the agreement of the United Nations, on 19 January 2007. Amison,
European Commission, available at http:l/ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peacesupport-operations/amisom_ en.htm (l_ast visited Apr. 13, 2013); Against Somalia's backdrop of doomed
interventions, AMJSOM spokesman, LT. Col. Paddy Ankunda stated the "mission [was] to support the PFG
mission to stabilize the country [of Somalia], to create conditions for ... reconciliation, reconstruction and
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During 2009, approximately 23,000 ships, with $952 billion of trade
transited the Gulf of Aden. Of these ships less than 0.01% [were] hijacked.
On average, 40,000 ships per year transit the wider Indian Ocean.
POPULATION AND HUMANITARIAN STATISTICS

Population: 9.3 million (2011 UN Population Division);
Average life expectancy: 48 years (2009 UNDP Human Development
Report);
Total number of Internally Displaced Persons: 1.46 million (April 2011);
Over 700,000 Somalis have sought refugee status in other countries, and
People needing emergency humanitarian or livelihood assistance: 2.4
million (Jan 2011).
ECONOMIC FIGURES

GDP per head $200 (2001); 43% of the population living on less than $1
per day;
Exports: $460 million (2008 figures);
Global diaspora remittances to Somalia: [Approximately] $1 billion p.a,
and
International aid: $250 million (2007).

development." Muhyadin Ahmed Roble & Rijal Farah, What is AMlSOM? Somalia Report (July 5, 2012),
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/34 79/What_is_AM ISOM.
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APPENDIXB
EXCERPT FROM MARITIME ADVISORY

215

1. THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR
(IRTC) ANNOUNCED IN REF A IS IN EFFECT AS OF 01 FEB 2009 AT
OOOlZ.
2. ALL VESSELS THAT COMMENCED A TRANSIT THROUGH THE
PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED CORRIDOR PRIOR TO OOOlZ 01 FEB 2009
SHOULD COMPLETE THEIR TRANSIT USING THE PRE-EXISTING
COORDINATES. DO NOT SHIFT TO THE IRTC IN MID TRANSIT.
3. ALL VESSELS COMMENCING TRANSITS AFTER OOOlZ 01FEB2009
SHOULD USE THE IRTC.
4. THE IRTC EAST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 045 EAST BETWEEN 11
48 NORTH AND 11 53 NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A
STRAIGHT LINE COURSE OF 072 DEGREES AND TERMINATES AT 053
DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 18 NORTH AND 14 23 NORTH. THE IRTC
WEST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 25
NORTH AND 14 30 NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A
STRAIGHT LINE COURSE OF 252 AND TERMINATES AT 045 DEGREES
EAST BETWEEN 11 55 NORTH AND 12 00 NORTH.
5. THE IRTC IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL
NAVIGATIONAL MEANS, NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE A DEDICATED
TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME, BUT IN ORDER FOR WARSHIP
PATROLS TO BE EFFECTNE, VESSELS TRANSITING THE GULF OF
ADEN ARE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO ADHERE TO THESE
GUIDELINES.
6. DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD FROM 01 TO 04 FEB, WARSHIPS
PATROLLING THE AREA WILL MONITOR TRAFFIC TRANSITING BOTH
THE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED CORRIDOR AND THE NEWLY
ESTABLISHED IRTC.

215.
Update to Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE MARLO,
available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/Guidance/Corridor.htm (last visited May 3, 2013).

